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THE NEW DEAL AT WORK
PETER CAPPELLI*

INTRODUCTION

Most observers of the corporate world believe that the
traditional relationship between employer and employee is gone. But
why the change occurred is not well understood, and what is replacing
it often seems like a mystery.
What ended the traditional employment relationship is a variety
of new management practices, driven by a changing environment,
that essentially has brought the market-both the market for a
company's products and the labor market for its employees-directly
inside the firm. And once inside, its logic quickly has become
dominant, pushing out of its way the behavioral principles of
reciprocity and long-term commitment, the internal promotion and
development practices, and the concerns about equity that underlie
the more traditional employment contract. The policies and practices
that buffered the relationship with employees from outside pressures
are gone. The end of employee loyalty to an organization, replaced
by greater attachment to careers, is but one manifestation of this
change.
Most attempts by companies to draw up a new contract
represented wishful thinking as they sought simply to lower the
expectations of employees by explicitly limiting the employer's
obligations on job security and career development (the dreaded
"employability" doctrine that pushes responsibility for careers onto
employees), while assuming that most other aspects of the relationship, including high levels of employee performance, would continue.
In fact, virtually every aspect of employment changes now that the
market governs this relationship. From the difficulty that employers
* George W. Taylor Professor of Management, the Wharton School, University of
Pennsylvania. The material in this Article is excerpted from PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL
AT WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE (1999), and from a longer
discussion of some of these issues in Peter Cappelli, CareerJobs Are Dead, 42 CAL. MGMT.
REV. 146 (1999).
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have in recouping training investments to the substitutes that must be
found for employee motivation and commitment, the new relationship dramatically changes how firms must manage their employees.
If the new employment relationship is not defined unilaterally by
employer attempts to dictate a new deal, then what is it? It is
tempting to think of the new relationship as something like free
agency where legal contracts can be used to govern all aspects of the
relationship, much as they do for professional sports or temporary
help. There are some jobs where this model fits well, especially those
where performance is easy to specify in advance and monitor after
the fact. Jobs that can be contracted out, such as many positions in
the world of information technology, fall into this category.
But for a great many positions, especially those in management,
contracts struck in the market cannot define an employment
relationship. At least some of the skills are unique to the employer
and developed on the job, the tasks are interdependent with others or
with systems in the organization, and performance is difficult to
monitor accurately, all of which make contracts imperfect at best.
Nor are managers professionals. Their work is governed by standards
inside the organization, not professional codes, and their success is
inextricably linked to that of their employer. The most important
rewards for managers are still associated with promotion inside a
company hierarchy.
The contradiction inherent in the new relationship comes from
the fact that the nature of the work that most managers in particular
perform does not lend itself to market-based relationships and
contracts. It is much more suited to open-ended relationships where
the obligations can be adjusted, performance can be observed, and
rewards allocated accordingly as situations change. Some level of
mutual commitment and trust to facilitate changing needs is
inevitable as is the need to develop some unique skills inside the
organization and to retain them indefinitely.
At the same time, the pressures from markets and the need to
change organizations means that truly open-ended, long-term
employment relationships are largely dead. The pressures to shed
obsolete skills (compounded by the uncertainty of knowing which
ones will be obsolete) and the problem of poaching skills from other
employers make it difficult to maintain commitment and trust,
develop skills internally, and retain important skills. The defining
problem of the new relationship, therefore, is how to graft the model
of the market onto occupations for which it is poorly suited.

20001

THE NEW DEAL AT WORK

Observers sometimes refer to the traditional, lifetime
employment relationship as something like a marriage. Using that
analogy, the new employment relationship is a lifetime of divorces
and remarriages. It is not simply dating because that suggests
relationships that are too casual and short-term to facilitate the
functions that need to be performed in most organizations. It is more
like serial monogamy, a series of close relationships governed by the
expectation going in that they need to be made to work and yet will
inevitably not last.
And the adaptations to a life of serial
monogamy-always keeping your options open with other partners,
avoiding long-term investments in each other with prenuptial
agreements, and reducing the issues on which violations of trust
matter (e.g., no big life insurance policies naming them as the
beneficiaries) -are not unlike the career advice given to employees in
the modern workplace.
The analogy of marriage and divorce is troublesome as a
metaphor because it typically suggests a broken commitment and the
violation of a trust. The trauma of workers who have been downsized
is sometimes likened to divorce precisely to highlight the sense that
the employer has broken a commitment.
Suppose for the moment, however, that both sides entered a
relationship with the same expectation that it could be temporary.
There are many successful relationships involving mutual
commitments that each party knows going in will not last. The
relationship between students and colleges is but one example: both
parties go in not only knowing that the relationship will end but also,
generally speaking, when it will end. What is different about the new
employment relationship is that, while both parties know that the
relationship is unlikely to last forever, it has no finite ending point but
instead can be ended unilaterally by either side when they want.
So the new employment relationship is an uneasy dance between
an open-ended relationship and the pull of the market. The parties
are constantly negotiating their commitments in light of uncertain
future needs and opportunities elsewhere. Pressures from outside the
relationship, from the labor market in particular, are now the
important forces shaping the nature of the relationship. When labor
markets are slack and jobs are difficult to find, employees become
more loyal to their employer and bear most of the costs of
restructuring; when labor markets tighten, employee commitment
falls and employers become more willing to make investments in their
employees.
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As with any change, the new employment relationship where the
labor market dominates employee behavior is creating a new set of
winners and losers. For most of the past two decades, it was easy to
keep score: employers won and employees lost because, with this
new, market-mediated relationship, slack labor markets allowed
employers to push most of the costs of restructuring onto employees.
The advice for employees was simple: try to develop other job
options, just in case, and prepare psychologically to get whacked. For
employers, the management of employees was such a simple matter
that observers seriously questioned whether the human resource
function was even necessary.
Once labor markets begin to tighten, however, the problems are
no longer simple. When bargaining power becomes a bit more equal,
then the problem of negotiating this open-ended relationship in the
context of a market becomes very tricky indeed. Even though
employers may not have all the power, the job of shaping the
employment relationship in response to these negotiations and
making it work falls to them because they control the mechanisms
through which the relationship can adapt-how jobs are designed,
compensation structured, training delivered, and the other aspects of
employment. Which employers will come out on the winning side of
this new relationship depends on how well they can adapt and
whether they can find ways to manage employee commitment,
develop the skills they need, and retain those workers in the context
of a much more open and powerful labor market.
I.

WHAT CAUSED THE CHANGE?

One place to start this discussion is to recall that as late as the
second decade of the twentieth century, employment relationships
were more like a free market than perhaps even today. The "inside
contractor" model was the dominant system for manufacturing,
essentially a model of virtual organizations where owners outsourced
even production operations to contractors operating in the owner's
facility. Professional agents handled the marketing, sales, and
distribution of companies on a fee or contingent contract basis.
Employees in some industries, such as tapestries, moved routinely
from company to company, facilitating knowledge transfer in the
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process. The turnover of key talent was managed carefully, but
turnover of other employees was often remarkably high.'
The history of U.S. employer paternalism has been explored
elsewhere at length. 2 A summary suggests that efforts to protect
production workers from market forces were common but perhaps
never ran very deep.3
Even in this golden age of employee
protections, from World War II until the 1981 recession, workers
were constantly being laid off with the business cycle. They had
stable jobs in the sense that they would return to the same employer,
but layoffs were typical. Employer support for collective bargaining
never meant any widespread acceptance of unions, and it may never
really have been very deep. By the 1970s, for example, sophisticated
union avoidance campaigns were common, and many employersperhaps a majority-were taking actions to undermine the unions,
4
some of which included violations of labor law.
The story for white-collar workers was always different. There
the model for managing employees was not welfare capitalism, which
was directed at production workers, but managerial capitalism, where
the managers of the company acted to pursue their own goals as
distinct from those of the owners. White-collar and managerial
employees were the organization, at least in the eyes of the
executives.
What most people think of as career jobs-good
prospects for steady, predictable advancement, lifetime security
subject to minimum performance levels, as well as good wages and
benefits-was more or less in place with the formation of large, multidivisional corporations, expanding in scope and scale as the
management structures expanded. In this model, employees were
hired based on general skills and attributes, received elaborate initial
1. See Peter Cappelli, Contemporary Employment Practices in HistoricalPerspective, in
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY AND HUMAN CAPITAL (Margaret Blair & Thomas A. Kochan

eds., forthcoming).
2. See generally STUART D. BRANDES, AMERICAN WELFARE CAPITALISM, 1880-1940
(1976); SANFORD M. JACOBY, MODERN MANORS: WELFARE CAPITALISM SINCE THE NEW
DEAL (1997); DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND WORKERS: ORIGINS OF THE TWENTIETH-

1880-1920 (2d ed. 1995).
3. Not everyone thought that these arrangements were necessarily better for employees
than the previous more market-driven era because employees gave up control for security. In
the former system, the argument goes, at least employees had more autonomy. See Stephen A.
Marglin, What Do Bosses Do? The Origins and Functionsof Hierarchyin Capitalist Production,
REV. RADICAL POL. ECON., Summer 1974, at 60.
4. For a detailed guide to these practices, which remained accurate until the early 1980s,
CENTURY FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED STATES,

see SUMNER

H.

SLICHTER

ET AL.,

THE

IMPACT OF

COLLECTIVE BARGAINING

ON

MANAGEMENT (1960). For an analysis of the decline of that system, see THOMAS A. KOCHAN
ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS (1986).
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training, and had a career that was internal to the firm. The systems
for managing employees, such as wage and benefit policies, training
and development systems, promotion ladders, and other practices of
internal labor markets, were part of the elaborate internal
administration of the firm.5
What is easy to forget now is the rather obvious dark side of
these arrangements, especially for managers. Internal labor markets
with outside hiring only at the entry level and all promotions internal
to the company meant that employees were stuck with their current
employer. If they did not fit, they had no choice but to suffer or
adapt, and fitting in had as much to do with altering one's politics,
social attitudes, and values as it did with performance. William H.
Whyte's classic The Organization Man 6 is perhaps the best known
critique of this system, but other observers like C. Wright Mills, 7 and
two decades later, Rosabeth Moss Kanter,8 helped document the
often coercive effects it had on employees.
Both the operating environment and the nature of companies
were different in that period in ways that made it substantially easier
to provide stable employment and career paths. Especially for large
companies, product markets were stable and much more predictable
because many industries were explicitly regulated by the government
to ensure stability. Foreign competition was very limited, and
domestic competition often operated as an oligopoly where unions
effectively took labor costs out of competition with standardized
union contracts.
Large companies like IBM made ten- and fifteen-year business
plans that proved accurate. In the context of such plans, it was
sensible and realistic to lay out equivalent human resource plans and
to say to individual employees: This is our career plan for you until
you retire, and here is how we are going to manage you to ensure that
it happens. Whatever economic instability these large companies
experienced was mainly the temporary kind associated with business
cycles. Companies like IBM argued, with some justification, that the
employment security they offered employees facilitated what by
contemporary standards was low-level restructuring of operations

5. For the classic study of managerial capitalism, see ADOLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER
C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
6. WILLIAM H. WHYTE, JR., THE ORGANIZATION MAN (1956).
7. See C. WRIGHT MILLS, WHITE COLLAR: THE AMERICAN MIDDLE CLASSES (1956).
8. See ROSABETH MOSS KANTER, MEN AND WOMEN OF THE CORPORATION (1977).
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brought on by unforeseen market changes.9 But there was relatively
little pressure to maximize shareholder value, at least by
contemporary standards, and executives had much greater discretion
to devote resources to such goals.
The world began to change for employers with the 1981-82
recession, the worst economic period since the Great Depression,
which brought with it structural changes that went well beyond the
usual cyclical downturn in product demand. A number of important
changes in the economy and in the way business was conducted got
underway in that period. They include the following:
A. Pressures to Increase Shareholder Value: The rising
influence of institutional investors and legal decisions made
maximizing shareholder value not only the singular goal for
directors of public companies and the executives they
managed, but also made shareholders the only stakeholder
to whom companies were legally accountable.
New
financial institutions such as junk bonds made possible
hostile takeovers of companies that were not maximizing
shareholder value. Any resources that companies may have
devoted to other causes, such as protecting employees from
business risks, were quickly transferred to the goal of
shareholder value. 10 More important, investors and analysts
seem to be persuaded that cutting jobs raises shareholder
value even though the hard evidence on that point is
decidedly mixed. New accounting techniques, such as
economic value added to maximize shareholder value,
punish fixed costs, including the fixed investments in
employees.1
B. Changes in the Boundaries of the Firm: Companies were
persuaded that divesting unrelated businesses and acquiring
new ones with appropriate synergies could raise shareholder
value, and mergers and acquisitions rose to record levels

9. For a persuasive argument of this case, see D. QUINN MILLS, THE IBM LESSON: THE
PROFITABLE ART OF FULL EMPLOYMENT (1988).
10. One might argue that such practices might actually benefit shareholders by improving
company performance. The problem is that there is no solid evidence for this position, and
every anecdote of a company that appears to succeed in this fashion can be countered by
another anecdote about companies that do not.
11. The rise of these pressures from the investor community is perhaps the most important
development in the world of business in a generation. See MICHAEL USEEM, INVESTOR
CAPITALISM: How MONEY MANAGERS ARE CHANGING THE FACE OF CORPORATE AMERICA
(1996).
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year after year. Companies concerned about focusing on
their core competencies learned to outsource functions that
were not central to their capabilities and to pursue joint
ventures as an alternative to internal development of
capabilities.
The consequence for employment was to
disrupt long-term career paths and, more fundamentally, to
make the security of all functions and jobs uncertain. Any
operation could be divested if changing markets and
changing patterns of competition align themselves, and all
functions could be outsourced if a low-cost vendor comes
along. One might say that the number of good jobs stays the
same in this model and just moves around from company to
company, but such movement and the constant uncertainty
about movement undermines job security and any attempt
to develop long-term careers.
Changes in the Speed of Competition: Shorter production
cycles and more rapid change in business strategies
associated with faster-paced competition makes skills
obsolete more quickly. The examples here are like the
change from physical chemistry to biotechnology in pharmaceuticals or from one market segment in insurance to
another, where the skills needed are completely different.
Employers simply do not have time to develop the new
skills they need internally where dramatic changes in
products and strategies happen quickly. So they turn to
outside hiring to get those new skills. They also turn to
outside hiring to get the managerial skills and experience to
facilitate changes in their administrative operations. One
way to think about these developments is that product life
cycles have now become shorter than the expected career of
an employee, as explained below.
Changes in Management Systems: Work systems that
empower employees, such as cross-functional teams, break
down traditional job ladders, eliminate supervisory
positions, and widen spans of control. Information systems
eliminate many of the internal control functions of middle
management positions, and decentralizing operations
through the creation of profit centers and similar arrangements further reduce the need for central administration.
Flatter hierarchies and the sharp reduction in central
administration reduces promotion prospects.
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E.

F.

Policy Pressure: Public policy in the 1980s contributed to the
pressures to unbundle employee protection provisions
inside firms. The Reagan Administration explicitly argued
for increasing employer discretion in employment decisions
in an attempt to link economic competitiveness to the ability
to shed redundant employees, a position that arguably had
more influence on management than the decision to fire the
striking Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization
workers. Various reports gave guidance as to the best ways
to cut workforces. Even under a democratic administration,
the U.S. Department of Labor had by 1995 accepted that
companies would continue to restructure their operations in
ways that cut jobs. It argued not for preventing such changes
12
but for minimizing the damage to employees.
Coercive pressures from leaders in the employer
community also reversed.
IBM's announcement of its
decision to abandon employment security and lay off
employees was followed shortly thereafter by a wave of
layoffs among other large employers. The business community organized itself to press for greater flexibility in
employment. For example, the Labor Policy Association, an
employer group concerned with public policy, produced a
widely circulated study arguing that the key to improved
corporate performance is greater management discretion in
employment decisions, in other words, the end of
administrative practices to protect jobs.
The requirements of employment legislation also created
incentives to unravel the internalized employment structure,
incentives that built as regulations increased. The vast array
of federal legislation directed at employment has largely been
tied to the traditional, internalized model of employment.
Alternative arrangements, such as contracting out or
contingent work, can mean that "employers" are no longer
covered by the legislation, freeing them from its obligations.
Market Alternatives: An enormous market has developed
to respond to these developments. Vendors who will take in
every function that could be outsourced now exist. Staffing
agencies will lease employees with any set of skills, even

12. See OFFICE OF THE AM. WORKPLACE,
RESPONSIBLE RESTRUCTURING (1995).

U.S.
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CEOs, so that labor costs can be transformed from fixed to
variable costs.

And, as noted below, corporate recruiters

now offer a rich menu of available applicants to any
employer willing to pursue outside hiring.
White-collar and managerial employees have experienced the

most fundamental changes because they are the ones with the most
protections to lose. First, they now face much the same increased
insecurity and instability as production workers, a profound change as
it undermines what has been the very basis of the distinction between
white collar and blue collar. That distinction stems from the New
Deal Era's Fair Labor Standards Act which was based on the

assumption that production workers needed legislative protections
that white-collar workers did not because the latter were already
protected by the firm. Second, white-collar employees have seen
internal careers evaporate as job ladders shrink, restructuring disrupts
the promotion tracks that remain, and external hiring blocks
advancement by filling more senior positions. To argue that there has
been no significant change in employment relationships requires
asserting either that the above changes in the employer's world are
not very significant or that somehow they never got down to the

employees.
II.

EVIDENCE OF A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP

Some labor market evidence is available that relates to the
decline in internal labor markets and secure careers. Some care is

necessary in interpreting this evidence, however, because a large
percentage of the workforce never had anything like the traditional
relationships in the first place. 13 So a finding that there is only a
13. Even if we focus just on the private sector and leave out the roughly 11% of the
workforce who are self-employed, in farming, or in other jobs that do not fit the model of
working for an "employer," organizations still have to be a certain size before it is efficient to
have systems of internal development and training, job ladders, and other arrangements
associated with long-term commitments. Seven percent of private sector employees work in
establishments with fewer than five employees, and 44% are in establishments with fewer than
one hundred employees. William Wiatrowski, Small Businesses and Their Employees, 117
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 29, 30-31 (1994). One researcher calculated that organizations need a
minimum of five hundred employees to make formal compensation systems feasible. See
Robert S. Smith, Comparable Worth: Limited Coverage and the Exacerbation of Inequality, 41
INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 227, 232 (1988).
Another researcher argued that only about 40% of U.S. employees were in firms large
enough and old enough to even have a reputation in their community, something that he saw as
necessary to make the implicit contracts that were behind internalized employment practices
operate. See Walter Y. Oi, The Fixed Costs of Specialized Labor, in THE MEASUREMENT OF
LABOR COST 63, 105-06 (Jack E. Triplett ed., 1983). Even within those organizations, the
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modest change for the workforce as a whole might mask a
considerable breakdown in relationships for that segment of the
economy that truly had career jobs, such as managers. This may help
explain why observers who focus on labor market data are the least
likely to believe that there are important changes in employment,
organizations, especially managers, are
while those who study
14
perhaps the most likely.
One important piece of the evidence is the sharp rise in
unemployment for white-collar employees, especially relative to other
groups. 15 This is certainly among the strongest evidence that
whatever special protection this employee group had in the past is
gone. A second and more general trend has been the systematic
shifting of business risk onto employees accompanying the
restructuring of companies, a point that my colleagues and I have
documented at length. 16 This shift in risk is consistent with the view
that buffers against the market have broken down. Some of the more
important evidence concerning the change in the employment
relationship is examined below.
A.

Employee Tenure

Much of the argument suggesting that not much is new in
employee relationships turns on research about job tenure-how long
an employee stays with their employer. Because so much is based on
these findings, it is important to understand what they can and cannot
tell us. First and perhaps most important, it is a mistake to confuse
stable jobs with secure jobs. For example, an employee does not have
a secure relationship if the employer threatens to have her
terminated-literally-every night if her job performance fell. The
distinction is perhaps easiest to see in firm-level studies like Steven
Allen and Richard Clark's interesting finding that tenure rose in

lifetime commitment model was generally a phenomenon for managerial workers who typically
constituted about one-fifth of a company's workforce. If we define the workforce that ever had
the lifetime, career-based employment system as managerial employees in firms large enough to
have reputations, a rough estimate would be about 10% of the private sector workforce.
14. The focus of the business press on these issues, then, might not be because they are
necessarily sensationalist but because the issues are especially pertinent to their readersnamely, middle-class, managerial employees.
15. For an explicit comparison, see Peter Cappelli, Examining ManagerialDisplacement, 35
ACAD. MGMT. J.203 (1992).
16. See PETER CAPPELLI ET AL., CHANGE AT WORK (1997).
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large, stable firms during the 1990s while 16% of the jobs in those
17
firms were cut.
Tenure can be a difficult concept to interpret because it is driven
by two quite distinct components: voluntary quits and terminations.
From the perspective of employees, only terminations drive job
insecurity. We also know that these two components move in
opposite directions with the business cycle. Quits fall and dismissals
rise during downturns, visa versa during expansions. Because the two
components move in opposite directions, stability is built into the
overall tenure measure, which makes any changes in tenure
meaningful. The more important findings concern trends in quits and
in terminations examined separately. Here the results suggest, based
on three different sets of data, that permanent dismissals rose through
the 1980s and early 1990s while quit rates were falling. 18 One study in
particular found that the rate of dismissals increased sharply for older
workers with more tenure, doubling for workers ages 45 to 54.I9
It is probably fair to say that the inconsistent results about
changes in overall tenure rates, sometimes even using the same data,
does not make one especially sanguine about the robustness of labor
economics. 20 It may nevertheless be instructive to review the results.
As noted above, it is important to remember that not all workers had
long-term, stable relationships even in earlier periods. For example,
now as in the past, roughly 40% of the workforce has been with their
current employer less than two years. And, as noted above, average
stability can mask considerable variance for subgroups in the
workforce.
The above qualifications aside, while studies found reasonable
stability comparing the 1980s with earlier periods, more recent results
using data from the mid-1990s find declines in average tenure
especially for managerial employees but even for the workforce as a
17. Steven G. Allen et al., Have Jobs Become Less Stable in the 1990s? Evidence from
Employer Data, in ON THE JOB: IS LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT A THING OF THE PAST? (David
Neumark ed., forthcoming).
18. See Annette D. Bernhardt et al., Job Instability and Wages for Young Adult Men, J.
LAB. ECON. (forthcoming); Daniel Polsky, Changing Consequences of Job Separations in the
United States, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 565 (1999); Robert G. Valetta, Has Job Security in
the U.S. Declined?,FED. RESERVE BANK OF SAN FRANCISCO WKLY. LETTER, Feb. 16,1996.

19. See Polsky, supra note 18, at 571-73, for this result.
20. There are perhaps a dozen recent studies using at least four major data sets to assess
employee tenure. For a review of these studies, see PETER CAPPELLI, THE NEW DEAL AT
WORK: MANAGING THE MARKET-DRIVEN WORKFORCE 113-57 (1999). For a discussion of
even more recent studies, see 04

THE JOB: IS LONG-TERM EMPLOYMENT A THING OF THE

PAST? (David Neumark ed., forthcoming).
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whole. These include studies that compare cohorts over time which
seem to find the biggest changes, such as a 10% increase in the rate of
job changes for younger workers now as compared to earlier
decades. 21 They also find large declines in tenure for older, white men
in particular-the group most protected by internal labor markets.
For example, for men approaching retirement age (58 to 63) only
29% had been with the same employer for ten years or more as
compared to a figure of 47% in 1969.22 The most recent studies find
that the percentage of the workforce with long tenure jobs, ten years
or more, declined slightly from the late 1970s through 1993, and then
fell sharply through the current period and are now at the lowest level
in twenty years. 23 The finding that tenure declined for managerial
jobs is especially supportive of the arguments for the erosion of
24
internal career systems.
In most cases, the findings of declines in tenure are modest, but
these modest changes need to be assessed in the context of two
caveats in addition to the general ones presented earlier. First, many
of these studies are comparing tenure in the 1990s to the 1980s. The
1981-83 recession was the worst economic downturn since the Great
Depression while the period after 1992 is quickly becoming the
greatest economic expansion since the Depression. In this context,
the finding that jobs are only slightly less stable in the 1990s than in
the 1980s is hardly evidence of stable careers. Second, the declines in
overall tenure for the workforce as a whole come despite the fact that
tenure for women has been rising because they are now less likely to
2
quit their jobs when they get married or have children. 1
B. Job Security
A better alternative for assessing changes in the employment
relationship would be to look directly at job security rather than at
proxies like tenure. It is difficult to measure job security directly
except through changes in employer policies. As late as the end of
21. See Bernhardt et al., supra note 18.
22. See Christopher J. Ruhm, Secular Changes in the Work and Retirement Patterns of
Older Men, 30 J. HUM. RESOURCES 362, 367-73 (1995).
23. See HENRY S. FARBER, THE CHANGING FACE OF JOB Loss IN THE UNITED STATES,
1981-1995, at 3-5 (Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section Working Paper No. 382, 1997).
24. See David Neumark et al., Has Job Stability Declined Yet? New Evidence for the 1990s,
J. LAB. ECON. (forthcoming).
25. See Alison J. Wellington, Changes in the Male/Female Wage Gap, 1976-1985, 28 J.
HUM. RESOURCES 383 (1993).
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the 1970s, survey evidence from the Conference Board indicated that
management's priorities in setting employment practices were to
build a loyal, stable workforce. But a decade later, by the end of the
1980s, that priority had clearly shifted to increasing organizational
performance and reducing costs. 2 6 The most powerful evidence in this
regard is another Conference Board survey which found more than
two-thirds of the large employers in the sample reporting that they
had changed their practice and no longer offered employment
security; only 3% said that they still offered job security to
27
employees.
Employer decisions to end job security through downsizing are
another lens into the world of changing employment relationships.
Cutting workers to reduce costs and improve financial performance not just to respond to declines in business-is the essence of
downsizing, a phenomenon that began in the 1980s. The American
Management Association (the "AMA") surveyed the downsizing of
its member companies beginning in 1990. They found that the
incidence of downsizing increased virtually every year-despite the
economic expansion-until 1996 when 48.9% of companies reported
it, a trivial decline from 50% the year before. Forty percent had
downsizing in two or more separate years over the previous six. 8
Other surveys report roughly similar rates of downsizing. The scale
of these job cuts is unprecedented in a period of economic expansion.
The causes of downsizing have also changed. A growing number
of companies reported that downsizing now results from internal
management decisions, such as restructuring (66%) and outsourcing
(23%). Virtually none now cite overall economic conditions as an
explanation, and most of the companies that cut are profitable in the
year they are cutting. Further, downsizing is no longer necessarily
about shrinking the size of the workforce. Thirty-one percent of
those firms in the AMA surveys were actually adding and cutting
workers at the same time in 1996, and the average firm that had a
downsizing was in fact growing by 6%.29 This development suggests

26. For a discussion of these surveys, see RICHARD S. BELOUS, NATIONAL PLANNING
ASS'N, THE CONTINGENT ECONOMY: THE GROWTH OF THE TEMPORARY, PART-TIME AND
SUBCONTRACTED WORKFORCE (1989).
27. Conference Board, Implementing the New Employment Contract, HUM. RESOURCES

EXECUTIVE REV. 5 (1997).
28. See AMERICAN MANAGEMENT ASS'N, 1996 AMA SURVEY: CORPORATE DOWNSIZING, JOB ELIMINATION, AND JOB CREATION 4 (1996).

29. See id.
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that firms are relying on the outside labor market to restructure,
dropping skills that are no longer needed and bringing in new ones.
Data on workers who have been permanently displaced from
their jobs confirms the fact that job security is declining and is now no
longer dependent on business cycles. The overall rate at which
workers have been permanently displaced backed down a bit in the
late 1980s from the peak of the recession period (1981-83), but then
rose again-despite the economic recovery-and jumped sharply
through 1995. The rate at which workers were thrown out of their
jobs was about the same from 1993-95, a period of significant
economic expansion and prosperity in the economy as a whole, as
compared to the 1981-83 recession. 30 It is difficult to think of more
compelling evidence than this that the nature of the employment
relationship has changed.
About 15% of the workforce saw their jobs permanently
disappear during 1993-95. The cause of the job losses reported in
these surveys mirrors the developments in the firm surveys: shifting
away from economic or company-wide reasons such as downturns in
business or plant closings toward eliminating particular positions
associated with restructuring. Other manifestations of declining job
security include the fact that job losses now are much more likely
than in previous decades to be permanent; dismissals for cause, such
as poor performance, have increased along with downsizing; and
employees who were once largely immune from business cycle related
layoffs-not only white-collar but also older and more educated
workers-have seen their rate of job loss rise. Again, these
reductions in security have occurred in a period of economic
expansion.
C. Wages
Changes in the wage structure within organizations are another
aspect of the change in employment relationships. One of the main
functions of internal labor markets is to create distinctive wage
profiles that differ from market rates in order to serve the internal
goals of the organization. Job mobility within the same organization,
which tended to produce greater benefits in the form of higher wages,
was seen in part as the result of a better match between the attributes
30. See HENRY S. FARBER, HAS THE RATE OF JOB Loss INCREASED IN THE NINETIES? 5
(Princeton Univ. Indus. Relations Section Working Paper No. 394, 1998).
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of the employees and the requirements of the jobs as compared to job
changes in the outside labor market, a testament to the advantages of
the internal labor market in allocating labor. But by the early 1990s,
there was no longer any advantage to the inside moves as compared
to those across employers.31
The steady progression of wages based on seniority or tenure was
one of the hallmarks of internal systems. The apparent decline in the
return to tenure with the same employer is perhaps the most
compelling evidence of the decline of more traditional pay and
employment relationships. Researchers studying the semiconductor
industry, for example, found a decline in the wage premium paid to
more experienced workers. Among the explanations are that new
technical skills are becoming more important, and those skills are
learned not inside the firm but outside, typically in higher education.32
In aggregate data, the returns to seniority-that is, tenure with
the same employer-have collapsed in recent years.33 Studies have
shown a sharp decline in returns to seniority of about $3000 annually
between the 1970s and 1980s for workers with ten years of seniority.
The costs of job changing dropped dramatically, and workers who
changed jobs every other year saw almost the same earnings rise in
34
the late 1980s as did those who kept the same job for ten years.
Further, this effect varies depending on why one changes jobs.
The probability that employees who quit would find a job that offers
a large pay raise has increased by 5%, while the probability that those
who were dismissed would suffer a large decline in their pay has risen
by 17% over the previous decade. 35 These results suggest that a good,
lifetime match between an employee and a single employer is
becoming less important in determining an employee's long-term
success. By default, what must be becoming more important are
factors outside of the relationship with an individual employer,
factors associated with the outside market.

31. See STEFFANIE L. WILK & ELIZABETH A. CRAIG, SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?
OCCUPATIONAL MATCHING AND INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL MOBILITY (Wharton Sch. Dep't

of Management Working Paper, 1998).
32. See Benjamin A. Campbell & Vincent M. Valvano, Wage Structures and Inequality, in
THE COMPETITIVE SEMICONDUCTOR MANUFACTURING HUMAN RESOURCES PROJECr 87, 87-

116 (Claire Brown ed., 1997).
33. See Keith Chauvin, Firm-Specific Wage Growth and Changes in the Labor Market for
Managers, 15 MGMT. & DECISION ECON. 21-37 (1994).
34. See DAVID MARCOTTE, CENTER FOR GOV'T STUDIES, N. ILL. UNIV., EVIDENCE OF A
FALL IN THE WAGE PREMIUM FOR JOB SECURITY (1994).

35. See Polsky, supra note 18, at 573-76.
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Another hallmark of internal labor markets was that pay was
assigned to jobs rather than to individuals and that differences in pay
were associated with differences in jobs. Research suggests greater
risk and more variance in individual earnings over time that cannot
be accounted for by the usual characteristics of jobs. 36 Some part of
the greater variance may be because of a much stronger relationship
between individual performance and pay. Hay Associates, the
compensation firm, collects data from their clients on the pay
increases associated with different levels of individual performance as
measured by performance evaluation plans. In 1989, the increase
associated with the highest level of performance was 2.5 times larger
than the increase associated with the lowest level. By 1993, that ratio
37
had risen to a factor of four.
A 1996 Towers Perrin survey found that 61% of responding firms
were using variable pay and that 27% of firms were considering the
elimination of base pay increases altogether so that the only increases
38
in compensation would result from performance contingent pay.
The change in contingent compensation has been especially great for
executives. Bonuses as a share of total compensation rose more than
20% from 1986 to 1992.19 Contingent pay erodes the importance of
internal, administrative pay systems by placing greater weight on
factors that vary such as business and individual performance.
D. Pensions
Employee benefits end with employment, except pension plans
which represent a continuing obligation to employees-even if
employment ends (at least for vested employees) - and, as such, an
indication of a more permanent obligation for employers. As Sanford
4
Jacoby notes in his paper, pension plans have been on the decline. 0
Even more important than the decline in pension coverage has been
the shift in the nature of pensions from defined benefit plans, where
workers earn the right to predetermined benefit levels according to
36. See Peter Gottschalk & Robert Moffitt, A Welfare Dependence: Concepts, Measures,
and Trends, 84 AM. ECON. REV. 38-42 (1994).

37. See CAPPELLI ET AL., supra note 16, at 190.
38. See Sandra O'Neal, Recent Trends in Compensation Practices, Presentation to the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Oct. 1997).
39. See K.C. O'SHAUGHNESSY ET AL., CHANGES IN MANAGEMENT PAY STRUCTURES,
1981-1992, AND RISING RETURNS TO SKILL 17 (University of Cal. at Berkeley Inst. of Indus.
Relations Working Paper, 1998).
40. Sanford M. Jacoby, Are CareerJobs Headedfor Extinction?, 42 CAL. MGMT. REV. 123,
132 (1999).
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their years of service, toward defined contribution plans, where
employers make fixed contributions to a retirement fund for each
employee, especially 401(k) programs whereby employees contribute
directly to their retirement fund. 41 With this shift, the employer no
longer bears the risk of guaranteeing a stream of benefits. That
problem now falls to the employee. Thus, the employer's obligations
to the employee end with employment, a move away from long-term
relationships.
E.

Contingent Work

Another aspect of changes in employment mentioned in Jacoby's
article that is relevant to changes in career jobs, as opposed to good
jobs, is the extent of contingent work which is made up of temporary,
part-time, and self-employed work. 42 Perhaps a better term for this
category is nonstandard work because it emphasizes the common
characteristic of being something other than full-time employment.
Whether these jobs are good jobs as defined above is difficult to
assess and may ultimately turn on whether employees take them by
choice or because they cannot get full-time, permanent employment.
The rise of nonstandard work suggests something about the
growing employer preference for variable as opposed to fixed
employment costs. It is fair to say that nonstandard work may no
longer be growing, but it is also worth recognizing that most estimates
indicate that it already accounts for just under one-third of the jobs in
the United States.43 It might be reasonable to include contracting out
and vendors in this category, at least from the perspective of the
original firm, because they represent the movement of work that had
been inside the firm at fixed cost to work now done outside the firm
at variable cost. The outsourced jobs may still be good jobs, of
course, although they often represent significantly reduced career
opportunities."

41. See Richard A. Ippolito, Toward Explaining the Growth of Defined Contribution Plans,
34 INDUS. REL. 1 (1995).
42. Jacoby, supra note 40, at 130.
43. See Lewis M. Segal & Daniel G. Sullivan, The Growth of Temporary Services Work, J.
ECON. PERSP., Spring 1997, at 117, 118-19. The estimates of temporary help in particular count
only employees working for agencies, but estimates that include temps working directly for
employers might double the total number of temps, from 2% to 4% of the workforce.
44. Consider, for example, a company that outsources janitorial or other lower-level jobs to
a vendor. The janitors may still have full-time jobs, albeit now with a vendor. The likelihood of
being able to advance to any position outside of janitorial work, however, may well be reduced.
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F.

Outside Hiring

The nail in the coffin of the traditional employment relationship
is the greater use of outside hiring by employers. It is difficult to
assess the extent of outside hiring, but one study that did so found a
sizeable increase in the proportion of employers who sought
experienced workers for entry-level jobs. 45 My examination of
proprietary surveys of employers finds them reporting a greater
interest in outside hiring to meet skill needs.46 One interesting proxy
for the growth of outside hiring is the fact that the revenues from
corporate recruiting firms who perform outside searches for
companies tripled just during the mid-1990s. 47 Not only is there no
evidence that employers are making greater investments in their new
hires, but the evidence that we have suggests that they are making
substantially fewer investments, particularly in the extent of training
48
to learn new jobs.
Movement away from internalized practices does not suggest
that employers are necessarily headed toward free agency.
Nevertheless, the set of industries that are well toward that model is
more than just the margins of the economy. Silicon Valley is often
held up as the example of open labor markets with high levels of
mobility across firms and little planned internal development. It is
not just a geographic location but a metaphor for much of the entire
hi-tech sector of the country which operates on a similar model.
Something close to free agency now dominates a range of industries
such as movies and television, the investment industry, and
increasingly professional service firms (accounting, consulting, and
law firms in particular) where promotion to partner had meant a
lifetime career at that firm. Now movement across firms is common
even for associates. Moreover, "poaching" employees away from
other employers is now a phenomenon for all jobs where labor is in
short supply.
When employers switch from internal promotions to outside
hires, they effectively shut down their own internal labor market by
eliminating promotion prospects. They also eviscerate the internal

45. See Sara L. Rynes et al., Experienced Hiring Versus College Recruiting: Practices and
Emerging Trends, 50 PERSONNEL PSYCHOL 309, 321-30 (1997).
46. See CAPPELLI, supra note 20, at 181-220.
47. See id. at 215.
4& See Jill Constantine & David Neumark, Training and the Growth of Wage Inequality, 35
INDUS. REL. 491 (1996).
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labor markets of competitors because employees leave after
investments have been made. Finally, outside hiring shifts the
attention of employers from inside the firm to the network of
potential employers outside the firm where more-and quite likely
better-career opportunities lie.
III. WILL EMPLOYEE PROTECTIONS MAKE A COMEBACK?

The return of tight labor markets clearly does shift bargaining
power back toward the employees. There is no evidence, however,
that employees are using this opportunity to demand anything like a
return to the older model of employment relations. Employees
understand that promises about career paths and long-term security
are meaningless unless the changes in the business environment
outlined above are rolled back. But there is no practical way for
employees to bind their employers to the old model even if they
wanted to, short of explicit employment contracts which employers
loath to sign. Moreover, in tight labor markets, the last thing
employees want is an arrangement that would buffer them from those
markets and their benefits.
Evidence also seems to suggest that employees have already
begun to adapt to the new model. Ninety-four percent of employees
in a recent survey reported that they believed that they, and not their
employer, were responsible for their own job security. In another
survey, when asked what they wanted from employers, the top places
went to development opportunities. Job security came out in the
middle of the list. Surveys of MBA students find greater willingness
to take risks and little interest in the large corporations that may still
49
offer the best internal career paths.
There are some companies that continue to offer the old
model-typically privately held companies not subject to the financial
pressures of the investment community and often making products
with some protection from fast-changing competition. But finding
continuing examples of the old arrangements is no evidence of a
return to those arrangements. There are also many examples in this
tight labor market of companies trying to persuade their employees
not to quit. But it is difficult to find any examples where companies
are offering any concrete promises about future relationships.

49. For a review of this material, see CAPPELLI, supranote 20, at 181-220.
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Every company that I have seen that wants to improve retention
in fact is interested in retaining key talent, not necessarily all
employees. Every one of these companies also says that they want to
improve their ability to hire from the outside, a prospect that
undermines their own internal labor market and cuts against the
ability of other employers to retain employees. New work systems
like team-based arrangements are on the rise, and one might expect
them to require greater investments in employees and continuity.
But there is no evidence that employers are making those
investments. 0 Even where new work systems seem to require greater
commitment from employees, commitment does not require lifetime
or even permanent jobs as indicated by the studies showing that
contingent workers are just as committed as full-time employees.1
CONCLUSION

The history of employment relationships in the United States
makes clear that what we think of as the "traditional" model of longterm attachments, internal development, and mutual obligations may
turn out to have existed for little more than a generation. The current
move toward a more market-mediated employment relationship is in
some ways a return to earlier arrangements. It is a particularly
powerful transition in that markets represent especially elemental and
resilient mechanisms for managing relationships.
Once these developments are underway, it is not within the
power of an individual employer to return to the older arrangements.
In order for an employer to successfully return to more traditional
arrangements with long-term investments in employees, internal
promotions, and lifetime careers would require that competitors
agree not to poach away valuable talent and employees agree not to
leave for what, at some point, would inevitably be better offers than
they have internally. Neither is likely. It stretches the imagination to
believe that even large companies will be able to offer employees
better opportunities than the vast sea of possibilities in the outside
market.

50. See Paul Osterman, Skills, Training, and Work Organization in American
Establishments,34 INDUS. REL. 125, 138-43 (1995).
51. There are now many studies reporting this result, but the first one appears to be Jone
L. Pearce, Toward an Organizational Behavior of Contract Laborers: Their Psychological
Involvement and Effects on Employee Co-Workers, 36 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1082, 1090 (1993).
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These new arrangements create a new set of winners and losers.
A great many of the practices in the more traditional employment
relationship were designed to accommodate the equity concerns of
employees. Compensation practices, for example, tried to reflect the
view that seniority and responsibility should be rewarded, and that
employees performing tasks of comparable value should be treated
similarly. Markets, in contrast, are not good at equity. They reward
scarcity and contributions, supply and demand.
Market-based
employment relationships reward skills that are in demand and in
short supply, but only as long as that situation lasts. The results they
generate may be fundamentally at odds with the perceptions of
employees and the broader society about what is fair.
In slack labor markets employers are able to push even more
costs onto employees, while in tight labor markets employees are able
to extract more rents from employers.
Within the employee
population, those with marketable skills and the ability to manage
their own careers have made out very well; on the other hand, those
without skills, with constraints on their mobility, and lacking career
management skills have suffered even more than in the past. These
developments may help account for rising inequality in outcomes, and
they no doubt will exacerbate that trend. In particular, those who
have the resources to invest in their own careers will have even
greater advantages over those who do not.
The issue of skills and how they are developed is also central to
the problems raised by these new arrangements. An important part
of the skills that are valuable in society are developed at the
workplace through investments made by organizations in their
employees.
When the ability of the employer to fund those
investments declines, especially when the overall demand for skill
begins to rise, then the search for alternatives becomes imperative.
Some employers will continue to invest in firm-specific skills and
training where they can be reasonably certain that their employees
will not leave. Other employers will become net exporters of skill,
relying on the productive work of trainees who then move on to other
organizations for their competitive edge. Firms that can find ways to
combine work and learning, making it possible to support training,
will have a competitive advantage in attracting employees. The
prominent solution at the moment may be to push the problem of
skill development off onto employees and, in turn, onto the market.
Employer-generated skill standards are in effect credentials for skills
and are currently being drafted by industry associations.
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Individual workers now bear not only more of the responsibility
for getting skills and managing their careers but also much more of
the risks and uncertainty of doing business. Where employees
themselves will get both the skills and the information to manage
careers is another fundamental issue. They have been turning to
post-secondary education for help. Community colleges have been
particularly responsive with new course work offering some job skills,
especially for nonmanagement work. But help in career management
is not readily available yet. What kind of entrepreneurs will enter this
market and what their products will look like remains to be seen.
The new relationship also creates new problems for managers as
they try to address basic human resource issues. How organizations
will function in the absence of employee commitment, where workers
have a more individualistic and short-term orientation, is a farreaching question that raises general issues for organizations and
society as well. The new arrangements that are developing around
more market-based relationships seem to be generating a number of
internal contradictions. Organizations are demanding more from
employees but offering them less. Bureaucratic control systems are
replaced by systems with reduced supervision that require more
commitment from employees at a time when employers are reducing
their commitments to employees. More skills are required, including
more knowledge and skills specific to an organization, when the
employer's ability to fund those investments is decreasing.
These changes have important consequences for society as a
whole.
For example, employees with good skills, superior
information about opportunities, and an overall high level of
"marketability" may find that their job prospects are enhanced under
the new market-oriented system; those who lack skills and
information and are less marketable may find their prospects
deteriorating. Together, these changes may further the trend toward
increasing inequality in labor market outcomes that is already under
way in the United States.
Much of contemporary American society has been built around
stable employment relationships with predictable career advancement
and steady growth in wages: long-term individual investments like
home ownership and college educations for children, community ties
and the stability they bring, and aspects of a quality life outside of
work that are enhanced by reducing risk and uncertainty on the job.
There is already at least anecdotal evidence that younger employees
are more worried about getting a "nest egg" for financial security
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sooner and may be willing to take more risk to get it. How these
characteristics may change with the new employment relationship is
an open question.
Both a high level of information and a series of contracts to
enforce training agreements are needed to make the new
employment arrangements function effectively.
Meaningful
credentials are needed as a signal to employers about skills and as a
goal for employees. Potential employees need to be able to judge the
quality of a training experience, just as employers need to judge the
quality of a potential employee. Internalized systems of employment
offered employers detailed and accurate information about the
abilities of their employees which will be difficult to duplicate with
the outside labor market.
One consequence of these new
arrangements, then, is that there may be more "slippage"employees with the necessary abilities and talent are passed over
because they lack the necessary credentials.
Increased importance of the labor market means more
transactions and, in turn, more contracts to enforce them. With more
hiring and presumably more dismissals, the labor law governing such
actions will certainly get a workout that will make clear how its New
Deal roots are out of step with the contemporary scene. Both
employers and employees will need strong incentives not to cheat in
these transactions, such as reneging on training contracts.
Markets demand infrastructure to make them operate honestly
and efficiently. As the labor market becomes more important, the
need for information about jobs and workers, guidelines and
enforcement of contracts, and other aspects of infrastructure will rise.
Some industries have developed mechanisms for providing aspects of
this infrastructure. But at present, the government is the only player
in a position to deliver on a national scale the credential systems,
remedial training programs, protection for the displaced, and other
arrangements that could make the new system operate effectively.
It is difficult to envision policy options that would address the
problems that are generated by this new deal. The traditional
approach of prohibiting management decisions that hurt employees
and communities, such as plant closings, lacks political support in the
context of arguments linking competitiveness to flexibility. An
alternative approach, which avoids that conflict, is to reduce the
burdens associated with transitions between employers. These might
include making employee benefits more portable so that employees
do not lose health care coverage or pensions when they switch
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employers; reforming unemployment insurance to accommodate
temporary layoffs and to help assist employees who face permanent
job loss (California, for example, allows companies to draw on
unemployment insurance funds to retrain workers who are at risk of
layoff); providing much more substantive assistance for retraining
employees who are displaced from jobs, including greater access to
education; and moving from economic assistance based on
employment outcomes, such as the minimum wage, toward other
forms of assistance such as earned income tax credits.
The rising power of markets is one of the most important
developments of our generation, and the rise of labor market power is
part of that trend. The effects have been profound in many segments
of the economy and, I believe, are spreading to domains like
professional service firms that were once home to lifetime careers.
The extent to which these developments will come to permeate large
corporations, where managerial work in particular seems most suited
to internal labor markets, is a topic for speculation. There is little
doubt that at least some aspects of the market-driven employment
relationship are already in place even in these organizations. Its
influence raises new challenges not only for employees but also for
employers and society as well, with management challenges
exacerbated by tight labor markets and, conversely, employee
challenges worsened by slack labor markets. But the basic shift from
internalized employment systems toward a more market-dominated
relationship transcends the current state of the labor market and will
continue to reveal new issues for many years to come.

